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Network explanations raise foundational questions about the nature of sci-
entific explanation. The challenge discussed in this article comes from the fact
that network explanations are often thought to be non-causal, i.e. they do
not describe the dynamical or mechanistic interactions responsible for some
behaviour, instead they appeal to topological properties of network models de-
scribing the system. These non-causal features are often thought to be valuable
precisely because they do not invoke mechanistic or dynamical interactions and
provide insights that are not available through causal explanations.
Here, I address a central difficulty facing attempts to move away from
causal models of explanation; namely, how to recover the directionality of ex-
planation. Within causal models the directionality of explanation is identified
with the direction of causation. This solution is no longer available once we
move to non-causal accounts of explanation.
I will suggest a solution to this problem that emphasises the role of con-
ditions of application. In doing so, I will challenge the idea that sui generis
mathematical dependencies are the key to understand non-causal explana-
tions. The upshot is a conceptual account of explanation that accommodates
the possibility of non-causal network explanations. It also provides guidance
for how to evaluate such explanations.
1 Network explanations and evaluations of model apt-
ness for explanation
We are often interested not only in prediction but in understanding what is respon-
sible for the behaviour, pattern or phenomenon that we are interested in; we are
interested in explanations. Scientific explanations based on network models bring
to the surface foundational questions about the nature of scientific explanation.
On the one hand, many applications of network models appear explanatory
while not providing causal mechanistic information. For example, Huneman [2010]
and Kostic´ [2018] both argue that network models are sometimes genuinely ex-
planatory but not by providing information about causal processes. Instead, they
argue, network models sometimes derive their explanatory power from topological
∗Thank you to the referees, editors, and the the participants of Levels, Hierarchies, and Asym-
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properties of the network model. Kostic´ [2018, 80–81] gives an example of expla-
nation using Watts and Strogatz’s [1998] small-world graph model and the spread
of infectious disease.
In topological explanation, the explanatory relation (the relation be-
tween the explanans and explanandum) stands between a physical fact
or a property and a topological property. In the Watts and Strogatz
[1998] example, we have seen that the explanation of the physical fact
is a function of the system topology, i.e. in this example, small-world
topology shortens the path lengths between the whole neighbourhoods,
and neighbourhoods of neighbourhoods and in that way the infectious
disease can spread much more rapidly.
These types of examples push towards regarding network models as explanatory of
physical facts in ways that do not fit with taking explanations to provide informa-
tion about causal dynamical or mechanistic interactions.
On the other hand, a common way to distinguish mere predictions from expla-
nations is to distinguish between mere correlations and causation. In particular,
many philosophical accounts of scientific explanation of physical facts rely on the
directionality of the causal relation (from cause to effect but not vice versa) to ac-
count for the directionality of explanation and to distinguish mere prediction from
explanation.1 Once we allow non-causal network explanations of physical facts
we face the difficultly of distinguishing explanatory from non-explanatory network
model applications in some way that allows us to recover the distinction between
mere prediction and explanation. Craver [2016, 707] stresses this challenge (tak-
ing it to push against recognising network explanations as a type of non-causal
explanation).2
The problem of directionality and the puzzle of correlational networks
signal that, at least in many cases, the explanatory power of network
models derives from their ability to represent how phenomena are sit-
uated, etiologically and constitutively, in the causal and constitutive
structures of our complex world.
This article presents an alternative way of addressing the problem of directionality.
Instead of focusing on directed notions, such as causation, I will suggest a solution
focused on taking into account background knowledge about the network models’
conditions of application. That is, I will focus on the conditions that have to hold
in order for the model to aptly be applied to the system of interest. This removes
one source of worry about non-causal network explanations. They do not require a
new directed metaphysical notion akin to causation where it can be unclear what
this relation is and how we can evaluate whether it holds.
1For example Woodward [2003] and Strevens [2008].
2As does Reutlinger [2016] but Reutlinger leaves it open that non-causal explanations might
turn out to be symmetric.
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2 Assumptions about explanation
I will work with the assumption that explanation is distinguished from prediction
by providing information about what the explanatory target (the explanandum) de-
pends on. That is, explanations offer information about what would have happened
in non-actual circumstances as well as information about what can be predicted to
hold given the actual circumstances. This focus on counterfactual information is in
common with several accounts of causal explanation (notably, Woodward [2003]).
On its own this focus on dependence does not yet provide us with a solution to
the problem of directionality. In Jansson [2015], I argued that we can provide a
solution to the problem of directionality when it comes to law-based explanations
by focusing on the law’s conditions of application. This solution does not, however,
cover the types of non-causal explanations that we seem to find in network expla-
nations where topological properties are doing the explanatory work. To start to
cover such network explanations, I need to say a little more about the schematic
structure of explanatory models of physical facts that I am working with. I take
the process of giving a model explanation to have as a target a dependence external
to the model (type 4) and to have three steps that are of interest when capturing
the directionality of network explanations (dependence of type 1–3).3
Figure 1: A simplified modelling schema showing four types of dependence. Type 1–
3 are dependencies involved in the modelling process while type 4 is the dependence
that is the target of the model. The arrows run from dependee to depender (the
depender depends on the dependee).
First, we can ask how features of the model selected vary with features of the
explanatory target (type 1). Here, the model’s conditions of application are crucial.
When we are selecting a model for some particular explanatory target, we typically
confront questions about whether or not a particular model is apt. For example,
3I am calling each step a dependence to emphasises that the relationship should provide infor-
mation not only about the actual circumstance but also about what would happen under variations.
On its own this allows all dependencies to be merely inferential. However, I am calling type 4 a
world to world dependence since this is where it would be open to locate a worldly dependence (if
there are any).
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in order to judge whether a particular type of pendulum can aptly be modelled
for some purpose by using a simple pendulum model we need to answer questions
such as: Is the pendulum forced? Is the amplitude of swing small? Is the mass of
the pendulum rod negligible? Is the friction at the pivot low?, etc. Once we decide
that a simple gravitational pendulum model is an apt model of the target these
considerations are typically no longer explicitly represented in the model itself.
Second, we can ask how features explicitly represented in the model chosen depend
on other features similarly explicitly represented (type 2). For example, in the
simple pendulum model the period is a function of the length of the pendulum rod
and the acceleration due to gravity at the location of the pendulum. Third, we can
ask how features of the target system can be expected to vary when features of the
model do (type 3).
If we are willing to grant my starting assumption that explanation is a matter
of providing information both about what can be predicted to hold given the actual
circumstances and information about what would have held had circumstances been
different, then there are multiple sources of information about such dependencies
in the three steps outlined above. If we are interested in dependencies of type 4 but
are approaching them via a modelling processes then all of type 1–3 are needed.
It is tempting to take only the dependencies explicitly represented in the ex-
planatory model (type 2) to matter. However, this would be a mistake on the view
outlined above. In this article I will be particularly interested in how dependen-
cies that capture what it takes for the model to be an appropriate model for the
problem at hand (type 1) enters into explanations by the model. In order to take
the dependencies internal to model (type 2) to have succeeded in capturing part of
what the explanatory target depends upon, those dependencies have to be capable
of being embedded in a fuller account of the dependencies of the explanatory target.
When the explanatory target is sensitive to variations in the conditions that make
the application of the model apt, then we might take the dependencies internal to
the model (type 2) to be part of a broader account of what the explanatory tar-
get depends upon. This broader account of what the explanatory target depends
upon includes considerations of what the model aptness depends upon (type 1).
If, however, the explanatory target does not depend on the conditions that make
the model apt, then we have no reason to view the dependencies within the model
itself (type 2) as a partial story of the full dependencies of the explanatory target.
There is now no reason to take the internal dependencies (type 2) to be part of a
modelling schema that considers type 1–3 dependencies relative to the explanatory
target.4
This is not to deny that when the conditions that make the model apt hold,
we can have reason to take the model to be predictively accurate. However, being
predictively accurate in the actual circumstances does not show that we have a
model capable of being trusted to answer questions about what the explanatory
4I take explanation to be a success term so that an explanation has to succeed in capturing
(part of) the dependencies targeted. However, this means that we can only ever have good reason
to take a model to be or fail to be explanatory. It is always possible that the world has conspired
in such a way that our reasonable inferences about dependencies are mistaken.
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target would have been like had circumstances been different. To do this, we require
reliable dependence information throughout (from type 1 to 3).
For example, consider again the case of modelling a particular type of pendu-
lum by using a simple pendulum model. Let us say that the explanatory target
is the period of the pendulum. Here, the simple pendulum model can be explana-
tory. The model itself details the dependence of the period on, for example, the
length of the pendulum rod. In addition, the explanatory target, the period of
the pendulum, is sensitive to violations of the conditions that make the model apt.
For example, in general, had the friction at the pivot not been negligible then the
period of the pendulum would have been different, etc. The same does not hold for
the intuitively predictive but non-explanatory application of the simple pendulum
model to calculate the length of the pendulum rod. Within the simple pendulum
model, the length can be expressed as a function of the period and the acceleration
due to gravity. This is what allows the model to be predictively successful in calcu-
lating the length of the pendulum rod when the conditions for the model to be apt
are fulfilled. However, the length of the pendulum rod is not sensitive to whether
or not the conditions of aptness for the model are fulfilled. For example, we do not
have reason to think that had the friction at the pivot not been negligible then the
length of the pendulum rod would have been different.
3 Direction without a directed relation
The suggestion that I have outlined above is one that allows us to recover the direc-
tionality of explanation without postulating any particular directed relation that
is responsible for the directedness of explanation of a certain type. An otherwise
common response is to argue that the directedness of the causal relation (from
cause to effect) is responsible for the direction of causal explanation. This ap-
proach leaves the directionality of non-causal explanations unaccounted for unless
we can postulate a similar directed notion in the case of non-causal explanations.
There are several suggestions that do this. For example, Pincock [2015] (Kostic´
[2018] and Huneman [2010] also have versions of such proposals) postulates a type
of sui generis directed relation of dependence from the more abstract to the less
abstract in order to account for a type of non-causal explanation while Lange [2013]
makes use of a distinction between strengths of necessity.5 In the case of network
explanations, Craver [2016, 701] suggests that they sometimes require a directed
non-causal notion of constitution.
Network properties are explained in terms of nodes and edges (and not
vice versa) because the nodes and edges compose and are organized
into networks. Paradigm distinctively mathematical explanations thus
arguably rely for their explanatory force on ontic commitments that
determine the explanatory priority of causes to effects and parts to
wholes.
5In Jansson and Saatsi [forthcoming] we consider some reasons against these views.
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The suggestion that I am making in this article differs from all of these approaches
in that it does not start from the postulation of some metaphysical asymmet-
ric relation that is used to account for the direction of explanation. Rather, the
directionality in explanatory applications of network models to physical facts is
identified either from within the model or from an asymmetry in the sensitivity
of the explanatory target to the conditions that have to obtain in order for the
model to be aptly applied. There are several advantages to this approach. First,
the problem of identifying the direction of explanation is transformed from a meta-
physical problem where we face the challenge of how we can determine whether
the appropriate relation holds, to an epistemic one. When there is a dispute over
the direction of explanation (if any) for a particular case, we do not immediately
need to settle metaphysical questions over which relation holds.6 Of course, this is
not to say that it is always easy to determine the direction of explanation (if any)
but the type of questions that we have to answer are theoretically and, sometimes,
directly empirically tractable.
Second, it allows for a unified treatment of causal and non-causal explanations
of physical facts. This is important when we are dealing with explanations from
connected models that cross the causal/non-causal divide, and particularly so in
cases where a multiscale model covers scales that are typically treated very differ-
ently. For example, Pedersen et al. [2016] summarise such challenges in modelling
an avian compass as a distinctively quantum process. The proposed model of
avian navigation is radically multiscale since it involves both distinctively quan-
tum notions such as entanglement and distinctively higher scale notions such as
bird behaviour. Shrapnel [2014, 409–410] articulates the difficulty of recovering the
directionality of explanation in these cases.
Many philosophers believe that scientific explanations display an asym-
metry derived from underlying causal structure (Craver [2009]; Salmon
[1971]; Strevens [2008]). From this perspective, the explication of the
phenomena listed above provides clear support for the existence of quan-
tum causation. The philosophical literature, however, contains consid-
erable skepticism concerning objective quantum causal structure (Haus-
man and Woodward [1999]; van Fraassen [1982]; Woodward [2007]).
Typically, those who eschew quantum causation derive their arguments
from analysis of the correlations that appear in EPR type experiments,
the problem being that whilst the measurement results in such experi-
ments are clearly strongly correlated, they are thought not to be so in
virtue of underlying causal structure.
The need to capture directionality in multiscale explanatory models has been part
of the motivation to develop quantum causal models (QCMs).7 However, these
6Of course, non-metaphysical notions of causation also have this advantage but they still need
to be generalised to non-causal cases.
7See for example Shrapnel [2014] for a philosophical discussion of this case and Costa and
Shrapnel [2016] and Shrapnel [2019] for a suggestion for quantum causal modelling.
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models come with challenges, particularly when combined with other causal models
in order to provide multiscale explanatory models.8
This article explores an option that avoids imposing uniformity by exporting
causal frameworks for explanation to (intuitively) non-causal cases. In the next
section I will argue that the approach that focuses on conditions of apt model
application is promising in addressing directionality in non-causal cases.
4 Ko¨nigsberg’s bridges
In section 1 and 2, I argued for the need for criteria for determining when a model
appropriately captures the direction of explanation and highlighted some of the
advantages of doing this in terms that are neither directly causal nor given by a
metaphysical analogue to causation. I think that attention to the sensitivity of
the explanatory target to violations of the conditions of application of the model
are a promising source for recovering this directionality in non-causal terms.9 Yet,
network explanations seem particularly problematic for the prospect of allowing us
to recover the directionality of explanation without some sui generis notion of a
directed relation between mathematical properties and physical phenomena.
Let me illustrate the problem and the suggested solution with the familiar case
of Ko¨nigsberg’s bridges and the graph-theoretic explanation of the impossibility
of making a tour of the (historical) Ko¨nigsberg by crossing each and every of its
seven bridges exactly once and returning to the starting point. Below is Pincock’s
description of the explanation of the impossibility of touring Ko¨nigsberg in the way
described above that appeals to the graphs in figure 2.
[A]n explanation for this is that at least one vertex has an odd valence.
Whenever such a physical system has at least one bank or island with
an odd number of bridges from it, there will be no path that crosses
every bridge exactly once and that returns to the starting point. If the
situation were slightly different, as it is in K ′, and the valence of the
vertices were to be all even, then there would be a path of the desired
kind. [Pincock, 2007, 259]
8For example, in the quantum causal models developed by Costa and Shrapnel [2016] the nodes
of causal models are treated very differently in the quantum case compared to the classical causal
case (such as that of Pearl [2000]).
9I have developed this account in more detail for cases of nomological explanations in Jansson
[2015].
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(a) Ko¨nigsberg (b) K ′
Figure 2: The two graphs relevant to Pincock’s explanation
In this case, it is possible to run inferences in both explanatory and (intuitively)
non-explanatory directions. The appeal to the existence of a vertex with an odd
valance seems explanatory of the impossibility to do the suggested round tour.
However, the impossibility to do the suggested round tour also allows us to infer
the existence of a vertex with an odd valance (given that the graph is connected).
However, it does not seem to explain the existence of such a vertex. If we want to
accommodate this difference in explanatory directionality in a non-causal way, we
need to locate a difference that is not visible as a difference in implication when
the model’s conditions of application are fulfilled.
Some aspects relevant to explanatory directionality can be recovered from
within the model itself and so hold whether or not the model has a physical fact as
the explanatory target. For example, while the graph determines the valence of the
vertices, the valence of the vertices do not (in general) determine the graph. This
contributes to the directionality mentioned in Jansson and Saatsi [forthcoming];
merely fixing that the bridge system in question cannot be toured in the suggested
way does not fix the bridge system to any particular configuration but fixing the
bridge system to a particular configuration does determine its round-tourability.
However, this is not enough for a full solution to the directionality of explanation
in this case. The issue facing us now is that the non-tourability (in the suggested
way) of the bridge system in question does fix the existence of at least one vertex
with an odd valance and vice versa. If this was the full story then we would get
the result that the non-tourability of Ko¨nigsberg explains the existence of at least
one vertex with an odd valence. This suggests that directionality from within the
model is not the only source of explanatory directionality.
My suggestion is that this is where we need to consider the conditions of appli-
cation of the model. Within a dependence account of explanation, we are interested
in information about what the explanatory target depends on. When we are ex-
plaining physical facts some information about how the target would have been
different had other conditions been different can be expected to come from within
the explanatory model itself. However, once we recognise that explanatory models
typically have limited areas of application, part of what the explanatory target
depends on is likely to be captured in the conditions of application. While we
typically do not have a perfect understanding of the conditions of application, we
can generally articulate such conditions (at least in outline). When we do so, we
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are, on this view, providing a better understanding of what the explanatory target
depends upon and, thereby, providing more detailed explanations.
The model’s conditions of application provide an avenue for recovering direc-
tionality of explanation beyond what is explicitly covered in the explanatory model
itself. We can have good reason to take a particular target to depend on the con-
ditions of application of the model in question and to take the model to be an
explanatory one. Alternatively, we can have good reason to take a particular tar-
get to fail to depend on the conditions of application and the model to fail to be an
explanatory model even while maintaining that the model is (when the conditions
of application do hold) inferentially reliable. To illustrate this, consider our case of
making use of a graph-theoretic model to explain the non-tourability of Ko¨nigsberg
by the existence of at least one vertex with an odd valance. At first glance it is
easy to overlook the conditions that make the application of the model appropriate
since they are so readily available. Nonetheless, the model in question is only ap-
propriate under the assumption that the bridges are the only way to travel between
the different parts of Ko¨nigsberg, are such that they are possible to cross at will,
etc. If such conditions hold and the graph-theoretic model is appropriate to use,
then we can support the inference both from the existence of a vertex with an odd
valance to the non-tourability of the bridge system and vice versa. However, only
the round-tourability of the bridge system depends on the conditions of applica-
tion. The tourability of the bridge system is, in general, sensitive to whether or
not these conditions hold. Whether it is possible make the described round tour
depends on whether the bridges are the only permitted way of travelling between
the different parts of Ko¨nigsberg, whether they can be traversed, etc. However,
the valance of the vertices is not sensitive to these conditions of application. The
valences of the vertices in the graph-theoretic representation of the bridge system
are the same whether or not we could also travel between two parts of town via
boat or whether a bridge was blocked. The valences of the vertices is determined
by the graph. Although we can appropriately make inferences in both directions
when the conditions of application hold (from the non-tourability of Ko¨nigsberg
to the existence of at least one vertex with an odd valance and vice versa), the
target is only sensitive to the conditions of application in one direction. Granting
that we take explanation to differ from mere prediction in providing information
about dependencies, the application of the graph-theoretic model can explain the
non-tourability of Ko¨nigsberg’s bridge system in terms of the existence of a vertex
with an odd valence, but not vice versa.
The reason that conditions of application of the model are easily overlooked in
this case is that there are closely related explananda that are less directly about
a physical system such as Ko¨nigsberg’s bridges and, when pushed, eventually not
about a physical system at all but about the mathematical graph.10 For example,
Lange [forthcoming] takes the explanandum to rule out the use of boats.
10Kostic´ [2019] takes the generality of the explananda to determine whether a topological or
mechanical explanation is appropriate. Here I think that the explanation is topological even when
the explanandum is non-general.
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Likewise, the “law” that a network lacking the Euler feature is non-
traversable has no conditions of application but helps to explain why
Jones failed in attempting to traverse Ko¨nigsberg’s bridges. Jansson
might reply that the law’s conditions of application include (for in-
stance) that the bridges are the only way to get from one Ko¨nigsberg
island to another region of land—that there are no ferryboats, for in-
stance. After all (on this suggestion), had there been ferryboats, then
it would have been possible to traverse all of the bridges, each ex-
actly once, simply by crossing a bridge and then taking a ferryboat
to the start of the next bridge. (And if there had been ferryboats,
then the bridge arrangement would have been no different—exactly the
asymmetry that Jansson emphasizes.) However, this suggestion fails to
save Jansson’s proposal: the absence of ferryboats is not a condition
of the law’s application because the explanandum is the impossibility
of traversing (or the failure to traverse) each bridge exactly once by a
continuous, landlocked path (etc.). To use ferryboats to “traverse” the
bridges would be cheating. So even if there had been ferryboats, it
would have been impossible to traverse the bridges in the requisite way.
The law has no conditions of application to the relevant sort of bridge
traversal. [Lange, forthcoming, p. 14]
What Lange is suggesting is that there is an explanandum (or maybe the right
explanadum) that rules out the use of alternative means of travelling between the
landmasses of Ko¨nigsberg. I agree that this is a perfectly legitimate explanandum
but it does not remove the need for conditions of application of the explanatory
model. After all, it is still an assumption here that the bridges are such that
they can be crossed, etc. If they are not then the graph theoretic treatment of
the actual bridge system again fails to be apt for the question at hand. To avoid
any conditions of application we could try to abstract even further and define the
explanandum of interest to be whether a system with the layout of Ko¨nigsberg’s
bridge system could be traversed in the suggested way setting aside any actual
physical obstacles to undertake such a tour. However, this type of explanandum is
best understood as a question directly about what explains the non-traversability
(in a mathematical sense) of the graph typically associated with Ko¨nigsberg’s bridge
system rather than a question about the possibility of making a certain journey
across the physical Ko¨nigsberg.
Here I have been focusing on explanations of physical facts and strictly speaking
intra-mathematical explanations (where both the explanans and the explanandum
are mathematical) fall beyond the scope of what I have tried to address here. There
are good reasons to treat them differently. To have a potential intra-mathematical
explanation we would expect to look at the details of the proofs for the two direc-
tions and whether they are explanatory or not. This will be a completely different
explanation from the explanatory model that merely makes use of graph theory
that we have discussed so far. However, it will bring out further assumptions that
were previously hidden by our focus on a specific bridge system. In particular, the
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proofs hold under the assumptions that we are dealing with connected systems (the
graph associated with Ko¨nigsberg’s bridge system is connected). Whether a graph
has an Eulerian cycle (in the case of an application to a specific bridge system,
whether it is round-tourable in the way specified earlier) is sensitive to whether or
not the graph is connected. However, whether a graph has only even vertices is
not sensitive to whether the graph is connected or not.
The case that I have discussed so far is deliberately simple. However, I hope to
have shown how several difficult philosophical issues about non-causal explanation
arise even for simple cases. In general, it is not simple to determine the appropriate
conditions of application of a model or a law and whether the target is sensitive to
violations of those conditions. For example, the question of whether symmetries
explain conservation laws, conservation laws explain symmetries, or neither ex-
plains the other, can be treated in a similar way but here the assessment involves
questions about dependence that we do not have immediate access to.11 In the
next section I will consider how conditions of application play a role in determining
directionality in a less straightforward, but much discussed, case of explanation by
network models.
5 Small-World Network Models
In this section I would like to consider an objection to my account similar to the
one raised by Lange to the Ko¨nigsberg’s bridges case in the previous section. For
some uses of network model explanations it might seem that there are no particular
conditions of application. Rather, the system under investigation might be thought
to simply instantiate the relevant network properties.
Certain ways of talking fit well with such a view. For example, it is common to
find discussions that refer to the small-world properties or architecture of physical
systems. For example, Watts and Strogatz [1998, 442] conclude their article by
noting that ”[a]lthough small-world architecture has not received much attention,
we suggest that it will probably turn out to be widespread in biological, social
and man-made systems . . . ”. Of course, such ways of talking do not in and of
themselves commit authors to any specific view about the relationship between the
explanatory model and the explanatory target.12 However, if we take the above
ways of talking at face value then it is tempting to take the explanatory target
system to simply instantiate the relevant network (or topological) properties. For
example, I take this view to be the one expressed by, for example, Huneman [2018,
119] when writing that ”. . . in topological explanations, the topological facts are
explanatory, and not the various processes that in nature instantiate variously these
properties”
11For a discussion of these conditions see, for example, Brown and Holland [2004] and Smith
[2008].
12In his contribution to this issue Kostic´ presents what is at stake as a question about how
to understand the veridicality criterion on counterfactual approaches to network (or topological)
explanations.
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In combination with a dependence view of explanation the consequence of such
a view is that we should expect to find all the relevant explanatory counterfactuals
simply by paying attention to dependence of type 2 (the dependencies internal
to the model) since the explanatory target systems simply instantiate the relevant
network (or topological) properties. I have suggested that we need to pay attention
to what makes it apt to apply the relevant models in order to understand the
directionality of the explanations of physical facts given using these models. This
means that I think that we have reason to resist taking the explanatory target
systems to simply instantiate the relevant network properties.
To see what this looks like in practice, let us consider an example from Watts
and Strogatz [1998].13 Watts and Strogatz [1998] start with a regular ring lattice
with a fixed number of vertices and a fixed number of edges per vertex. This
ring lattice is then rewired with a probability p (so that p=0 leaves the perfectly
regular ring lattice intact and p=1 results in a random network). The characteristic
features of the resulting networks understood as a function of p is the clustering
coefficient (informally the ”cliquishness” of the graph) and the characteristic path
length (capturing the average number of edges that have to be traversed in order
to reach any node in the network). Small-world networks are characterised by a
low characteristic path lengths and high clustering. Watts and Strogatz [1998]
make use of these notions to understand how the structure of networks influences
the dynamics of disease spread. In particular they find that the infectiousness of
the disease (modelled as the probability that an infected individual infects a given
healthy neighbour) required in order for the disease to infect half of the population
decreases rapidly for small p. Informally, as we move away from a perfectly regular
ring lattice, the infectiousness required in order for a disease to end up affecting
half the population goes down rapidly. Finally, for diseases that are sufficiently
contagious to infect the entire network population, the time to complete infection
of the population closely follows the characteristic path length. The conclusion
drawn is that even intuitively minor deviations from perfectly regular networks has
a dramatic effect on the spread of infectious diseases. Moreover, the dynamics is
taken to be able to be understood via the network structure.
Thus, infectious diseases are predicted to spread much more easily and
quickly in a small world; the alarming and less obvious point is how few
short cuts are needed to make the world small.
Our model differs in some significant ways from other network models
of disease spreading. All the models indicate that network structure
influences the speed and extent of disease transmission, but our model
illuminates the dynamics as an explicit function of structure (Fig. 3),
rather than for a few particular topologies, such as random graphs, stars
and chains. [Watts and Strogatz, 1998, 442]
13I am focusing on this case since small-world network models are widely regarded as a key
example of network explanation by authors with varied views about how to understand the veridi-
cality criterion discussed by Kostic´ in this issue (see, for example, Huneman [2010] and Kostic´
[2018]).
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On one way of understanding this discussion, it seems be an assertion that in
order to understand some aspects of disease spread all we need is understanding
of certain network properties. However, I think that this conclusion should be
resisted.
Watts and Strogatz [1998] are clear that their discussion is focused on a certain
highly idealised model of disease spread. In order to take the dynamics of disease
spread to depend on the highly mathematical features of network structure we also
need to, on my account above, worry about how the dynamics of disease spread
depends on these idealisations. As in the case of Ko¨nigsberg’s bridges, I think that
these conditions of application hold the solution to account for why we are inclined
to, and correct to, take the structure to possibly explain the dynamics of disease
spread in the cases where the model applies but not vice versa. If we ignore the
conditions of application we again face a situation where we can make inferences in
seemingly non-explanatory directions. For example, we could make the inference
from the functional form for the time for global infection to the functional form for
the characteristic path length. Yet, this inferences does not look explanatory.
Without invoking some special notion of mathematical, abstract, metaphysical,
etc., dependence we can now try to identify the direction of explanation by asking
questions about the dependence of the explanatory target on the conditions of ap-
plication. For example, Watts and Strogatz’s [1998, 441] idealised model assumes
that we introduce a single sick individual into an otherwise healthy population and
that infected individuals are removed after one unit of time (by death or immunity).
Are properties of network structure, say the functional form for the characteristic
path length, sensitive to when these modelling assumptions hold or not? The an-
swer is that the relevant properties of network structure are completely insensitive
to whether or not we are dealing with a homogenous population of healthy indi-
viduals (barring the sole infected individual). This simply is not something that
features such as the characteristic path length capture. Is the explanatory target,
the dynamics of disease spread, sensitive to changes in these assumptions? The
answer is very plausibly yes. For example, if we do not start from a homogenous
healthy population (with the exception of the one infected individual) then we can
expect the dynamics of disease spread to look different. For example, consider the
effect on the spread of a new strain of an infectious disease if the population has
previously been infected with an earlier strain of the disease which provides im-
munity to the new mutation. As Leventhal et al. [2015, 7] note, “the initial strain
modifies the residual network of susceptibles” and the spread of infectious disease
should be expected to be sensitive to this. Leventhal et al. [2015] argue that here
heterogeneity in contact structure suppresses the spread of a new strain.
If we take the explanation of the dynamics of disease spread provided by Watts
and Strogatz [1998] to simply be one where the dynamics is understood purely
in terms of the network structure then this looks like a potential challenge to
their conclusions. However, on my view this would be the wrong conclusion to
draw. Rather, the broader understanding of the simplified model (including the
conditions of application) is what allows us to identify as explanatory certain in-
ferences that we can make when the model applies (taking other inferences to be
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non-explanatory). Since the explanatory target of the dynamics of disease spread
is sensitive to violations of the conditions of application the Watts and Strogatz
[1998] model can be regarded as explanatory by providing part of the story about
what infectious disease spread depends upon.
If my argument in this article is correct, understanding the assumptions and
limitations of network models is not only important in order to avoid mistakenly
applying the models in cases where they fail to apply. To understand how the
target phenomena depend on the assumptions of the network models is key to
understanding why the inferences drawn using network models sometimes count
and sometimes fail to count as explanatory at all.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that network explanations are (sometimes) examples of a broader
class of non-causal explanations. The challenge of addressing long-standing prob-
lems of distinguishing prediction from explanation that are otherwise resolved in
causal terms require new solutions in these cases. Many philosophical suggestions
postulate directed metaphysical notions to address this problem. I have argued
that an account of scientific explanation that includes the conditions of model apt-
ness as part of the explanation can address the problem of directionality without
facing the same difficulties as competing approaches.
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